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Introduction
On the morning of 8 May 1945 most of the world was celebrating V.E. Day. The boulevards of Paris, London and New York were filled to overflowing with jubilant crowds awakening to news that the Nazis had capitulated at long last. So, too, were the streets of the Algerian market town of S6tif, where the colons were gathering to join in spirit their compatriots in metropolitan France rejoicing in the ending of the mother country's five-year-long nightmare of surrender to Hitler's armies, occupation, collaboration and massive destruction at the hands of the liberating Allied forces (Home, 1977, p. 23) .
Marching toward S6tif's monument aux morts, where they intended to lay a commemorative wreath, the colons were confronted by a Muslim mob pouring in from the outskirts of town with something altogether different in mind. Some 8000 strong, carrying the green-and-white remaining inactive. The rational-choice calculus informing the last option takes into account such factors as the costs the individual will incur if his failure to act increases the likelihood that the terrorist group will succeed and his expectation of being a counted among the statistics of collateral damage.6
The fruits of terrorism are something of a public good. Because the benefits of a successful terrorist campaign will be shared by everyone belonging to the group as well as by outsiders who are sympathetic to its cause, selective incentives, including pecuniary rewards; access to education, job training and social services otherwise unavailable to group members or their families (Zakaria, 2003, p. 142 ); promises of compensation to relatives in the event of disablement or death; and even the assurance of a martyr's paradise often will be necessary to elicit optimal individual effort and to overcome the free-riding that inevitably plagues collective action (Olson, 1965; Tullock, 1974; Rathbone & Rowley, 2003, p. 559) .
Rational choice modeling yields insights into terrorist behavior not amenable to explanation by other social science methodologies. Although most terrorist acts are comparatively cheap, involving as they generally do small numbers of participants and inexpensive weaponry, the resources at a terrorist group's disposal necessarily are limited relative to the many and varied options available for accomplishing its purposes. As a result, a terrorist group faces the economic problem of allocating money and manpower cost-effectively, both across potential targets and over time, so as to maximize the expected net returns to its violent campaign. Viewing terrorism as primarily rational in the sense of economics generates testable predictions about how terrorist groups will go about solving that optimization problem and, in particular, how they will respond to changes in the anticipated benefits and costs of terrorist activity. The theoretical predictions of the rational-actor model have been of distinct value in understanding the consequences of public policies designed to parry terrorist threats.
It is important to recognize, in that regard, that terrorists enjoy a number of strategic and tactical advantages over government policymakers charged with the responsibility of protecting their homelands against terrorist attacks. Target selection is among the chief of these comparative advantages. Because nations cannot safeguard people and property everywhere, terrorist groups can strike where countermeasures remain feeble. Terrorist groups are well-positioned to exploit existing vulnerabilities because they typically are better informed about the strengths and weaknesses of a nation's defensive measures than governments are about the sizes, locations and effectiveness of terrorist cells, and they are organizationally less hierarchical, operationally more independent and, hence, more nimble and innovative in acting than public law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies are in reacting (Hirshleifer, 1991; Sandler, 2005) .
Governments, especially democratic governments, are constrained further in their responses to terrorism by the force of public opinion. Indeed, in addition to creating a climate of fear, terrorist groups may be able to achieve their goals by provoking governments into adopting repressive countermeasures that undermine civil liberties or simply disrupt daily life so much so that the citizenry turns its ire, not against the terrorists themselves, but against the governing regime. Extensive security precautions may also serve a terrorist group's cause by contributing to the public's perception of its power (Crenshaw, 1990, p. 19) .
Terrorists rationally search out "soft" targets and consequently respond in predictable ways to antiterrorist measures.7 Consistent with rational-choice theory, the historical record suggests that terrorist groups substituted kidnappings and assassinations of foreign-service personnel for embassy bombings when steps were taken to protect embassies against such threats. Similarly, terrorist hijackings of commercial aircraft declined in favor of other hostage-taking missions after airport security was tightened by installing metal detectors to screen boarding passengers (Landes, 1978) .8 In an age of transnational terrorism, defensive actions taken by one country may merely induce terrorists to transfer their attacks to less-secure venues abroad (Sandler, 2005 (Sandler, , 2006 . The available empirical evidence lends support to these and other predictions of the theory (Enders, Sandler & Cauley, 1990; Enders & Sandler, 1993 , 1995 .
Terrorism, it is important to emphasize, does not arise in a vacuum. It emerges from intergroup conflictover land or other physical resources, over control of the levers of political power, including patronage, and so on. "Gain (or avoidance of loss) is the common reason for undertaking warfare" (Tullock, 1974, p. 87) ; terrorism differs from war in means (and perhaps scale), but not in ends. Inter-group conflict, whether real or imagined, may supply the conditions necessary for overcoming free-riding by terrorist group members. Russell Hardin (1995, p. 5) , in fact, argues that individual "self-interest can often successfully be matched with group interest" (i.e., collective action is easier to organize) when a group's "benefit comes from the suppression of another group's interest."
Terrorist "waves"
Terrorism is age old, going back as far as the Jewish Zealots (sicari), who were active during Rome's occupation of Palestine (Laqueur, 1999, pp. 10-11) . In more recent times, it was given impetus by Robespierre's regime de la terreur (June 1793-July 1794) and, indeed, Edmund Burke has been credited with adding the word terrorist to the English lexicon in his Reflections on the Revolution in France, which railed against the "thousands of those Hell hounds called Terrorists ... let loose on the people" by the Jacobins, regularly assisted by Dr. Guillotin's famous invention (quoted in Hoffman, 1998, p. 17).9
Despite its murky origins, contemporary students of the history of terrorism tend to trace its modem beginnings to the founding, in 1878, of Narodnaya Volya ("People's Will" or "People's Freedom"), apparently the first group systematically to replace the "propaganda of ideas" with "propaganda by deed", a strategic reorientation attributed to Carlo Pisacane, who perished forty years earlier during an unsuccessful Italian revolt against Bourbon rule (ibid.; Rapoport, 2004, pp. 50-52) . Narodnaya Volya did not, however, engage in a campaign of indiscriminant violence. Like the Thermidorian Reign of Terror before it, Narodnaya Volya was organized, deliberate and methodical in selecting its victims, most of whom were prominent Russian government officials, culminating in the assassination of Tsar Alexander II on 1 March 1881 (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 17-18) .
Despite inevitable differences in the identities, objectives and tactics of the many terrorist groups that would come afterwards, David Rapoport, for one, nevertheless argues that Narodnaya Volya launched the first of what he identifies as the four waves of modem terrorism, an "anarchist wave" that spread from Russia to Western Europe, the Balkans and Asia, reaching its "high point... in the 1890s, sometimes called the 'Golden Age of Assassination"' (Rapoport, 2004, p. 52 In what follows, I adopt Rapoport's useful concept of terrorist waves to organize the history of terrorism since 1945. Beginning with the wave of "post-colonial" or "anti-colonial" terrorism that originated in the 1920s and continued for two decades beyond the Second World War's end, the discussion moves on to the wave of "New Left" terrorism that swept the globe during the middle of the second half of the twentieth century, and from there to the wave of "religious", mostly Islamist, terrorism ignited by the Iranian Revolution. Arranging the history of terrorism in this way is not meant to imply that every group active at any one time wore the same label. History is messy. Groups formed around "anti-colonial", "New Left" and "religious" ideologies appear in all three terrorist waves; the cycles of violence overlap one another. Terrorism nevertheless has changed character over time in ways distinctive enough to warrant separate treatment.
There is a unifying theme, however. As argued in section 6 below, much of the terrorism of the post-Second World War period originated in the grievances of ethnic and religious groups marginalized politically in artificial nation-states created by the colonial powers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Nationalist and ethnic separatist movements, aimed at achieving independence and self-determination, certainly played significant roles in motivating the first and third of the terrorist waves to have emerged in the period since 1945. To the extent that the left-wing terrorists of the second wave claimed solidarity with the "oppressed peoples" of Palestine and other Third World nations, the arbitrariness of the borders imposed on Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East, reinforced by illiberal constitutions and despotic rulers, can be said to be root causes of all three waves of modern terrorism.
There are exceptions, of course. The events of 1914-1922 do not explain the activities of today's Latin American terrorists, many of whom are involved heavily in drug trafficking. Nor do they have anything to do with the violence perpetrated by Japan's Aum Shinriyko and likeminded "cult" terrorist groups, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, or the Sudanese People's Liberation Army. In what follows, it is nevertheless argued that the history of terrorism since 1945 is in large part a consequence of the decisions taken immediately in the wake of the First World War and of the unkept promises made by the superpowers both then and forty years on.
SSpringer

Terrorism in the service of national liberation
[A]ll these panslavisms and nationhoods -it's all too old to be new.
-Fyodor Dostoevsky ([1872] 1994, p. 36)
The Second World War gave new life to a "post-colonial" or "anti-colonial" wave of terror that already was underway in the 1920s. It lasted for roughly 20 years beyond war's end, waned for a brief period during which left-wing terrorist groups held center stage, and reemerged with a vengeance in the last decade of the twentieth century. This first post-war wave of terrorist activity saw terror placed chiefly in the service of nationalism and ethnic separatism, decisively so in the creation of the new states of Algeria, Cyprus, Ireland and Israel, among others (Rapoport, 2004, p. 53 ).
Beginnings
The origins of terrorism motivated by nationalist goals, or at least that of the twentieth century's second half, can be traced directly to the decisions taken by the victors at the Paris Peace Conference that concluded the First World War (Rapoport, 2004, p. 52) . Woodrow Wilson, who had reluctantly and belatedly entangled the United States in European affairs and mired American troops in the mud of Belgium and France, naively thought that the "War to End all Wars" had, by smashing the Ottoman Empire beyond repair, supplied a golden opportunity for nation-building under the principle of "self-determination", a term he may have coined. Sailing aboard the George Washington with the American delegation to the peace conference, Wilson proclaimed, "We say now that all these people have the right to live their own lives under governments which they themselves choose to set up" (Macmillan, 2002, pp. 3, 11) . That credo had been memorialized in the president's famous "Fourteen Points", which framed the position America would take at Paris. Point number five sweepingly called for a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty, the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. (Quoted in ibid., p.
495)
Wilson's other points addressed more specific issues that would vex the conferees in clearing the political wreckage of global conflict. These included appeals for "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy... along clearly recognizable lines of nationality"; "the freest opportunity of autonomous development" for the peoples of Austria-Hungary; "the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined... along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality", accompanied by "international guarantees" of the states' "political and economic independence and territorial integrity"; "secure sovereignty" for the Turkish portions of the prostrate Ottoman Empire, but also "an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development" for other nationalities then under Turkish rule; and an "independent Polish state" created from "the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations...." Wilson's new world order was to be supervised by "a general association of nations ... formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike" (ibid., p. 496). As part of its responsibility, this League of Nations would Springer accept "mandates" for managing the affairs of peoples not yet ready for full sovereignty, but preparing them "by friendly counsel" for eventual statehood.
In the event, unwilling to compromise, weakened by illnessthe Spanish 'flu, not, as commonly believed, a minor stroke (Barry, 2004, p. 387)and unable to slake French thirst for vengeance against the Hun, an exhausted Wilson returned home from Paris to serve out his presidential term and, after a brief flurry of domestic politicking on behalf of American participation in the League of Nations, to watch in near silence as the Republicandominated US Senate refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles (ibid., pp. 487-492). Crippled by America's withdrawal from the world stage and fulfilling the terms of the secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, the League's mandates in the non-European parts of the defeated German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires were divided between Britain and France. The latter was granted mandatory powers in Syria and Lebanon; the former assumed mandates for Egypt, where she had ruled "temporarily" for decades (Fromkin, 1989, p. 415) , the Sudan, Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq (then known as Mesopotamia) and much of the territory now comprising the Gulf States.
In a preview of things to come after the Second World War, local resistance to the mandatory powers surfaced in short order as former imperial subjects, aggrieved by unbidden administration from London or Paris, began demanding the home rule Wilson had promised to them. Disorder began in Egypt, where "the principal British fantasy about the Middle East that it wanted to be governed by Britain, or with her assistanceran up against a stone wall of reality" (ibid., p. 420). Apparently "unaware of the implications of the profound social and economic changes brought about by the war; the new classes and ambitions that had emerged, the new interests, the new resentments, and the new sources of discord and disaffection", British military personnel and civil servants became the human targets of anticolonial sentiment, culminating "on 18 March [1919] in the murder of eight of themtwo officers, five soldiers, and an inspector of prisonson a train from Aswan to Cairo" (ibid., pp. 418-419).
Rebellion against the mandatory powers also enveloped Afghanistan. The assassination of the Emir on 19 February 1919 triggered a round of tribal infighting that in due course pulled Britain into a Third Afghan War (ibid., pp. 421-423). By 1920, violence had erupted across virtually all of the Middle East and Central Asia. "In the summer of 1919, three young British captains were murdered in Kurdistan"; before the next spring arrived, Arab raiding parties in Mesopotamia (Iraq) had killed six British officers and had executed two political officials taken as hostages. British outposts were overrun throughout the region; jihad was proclaimed against Britain in Karbalah and, in an act condemned in newspaper headlines as "Arab Treachery", a sheikh serving as legendary Colonel Gerald Leachman's host at a meeting of tribal allies, ordered him shot in the back after persuading him to release his armed escort. "How much longer", The Times demanded on 7 August 1920 (ibid., p. 452), "are valuable lives to be sacrificed in the vain endeavor to impose upon the Arab population an elaborate and expensive administration which they never asked for and do not want?"
Roused by the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which expressed the British government's willingness to look favorably on proposals leading to the establishment of a Jewish national homeland, the interwar period also witnessed the beginnings of the bloodshed that would engulf Palestine, Transjordan and Lebanon for the remainder of the century and beyond. The Irgun Zvai Le'umi, led by future Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, was born in Palestine "in the late 1930s as the armed wing of the right-wing Revisionist Party" (Laqueur, 1999, p. 22) . Other groups active in the years following the First World War included the Irish Republican Army, founded in 1916, although not initially as a terrorist organization Springer (Rapoport, 2004, p. 48 ); Russia's so-called Black Hundred, which engaged in a terror campaign against the Bolsheviks; the German Freikorps, small bands of students and former soldiers formed for similar purposes, whose most prominent victims were, in 1919, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, two heroes of that country's abortive socialist revolution, followed, in 1922, by the German foreign minister Walter Rathenau; and the Ustasha, a terrorist group supported by Benito Mussolini in its pursuit of Croatian national independence and responsible for the double murder of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and French prime minister Barthou during their joint meeting in Marseilles in April 1934 (Laqueur, 1999, pp. 21-22) .
Nationalism and ethnic separatism also were the prime motives underlying the terrorism that emerged in the immediate wake of the Second World War. The promises of selfdetermination contained in Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points had been reaffirmed before Pearl Harbor in an eight-point document signed by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill when they met on a warship off the coast of Newfoundland in 1941. Point two of the so-called Atlantic Charter "declared unequivocally that neither Britain nor the United States desired to 'see ... territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned"' (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 46-47) . Point three committed both countries to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live" (ibid., p. 47). Those principles subsequently were included in the Declaration of the United Nations, accepted by the two allies on 1 January 1942, and later signed by all countries at war with Germany (ibid.).
Colonial subjects once again were given reason to expect the return of peace to at the very least initiate processes to terminate foreign rule and to lay the foundations for transitions to national independence. It turned out, though, that the promises made by some of the signatories to the Atlantic Charter and to the UN Declaration were promises "they had no intention of keeping" (ibid.). Winston Churchill, for one, never meant the principle of self-determination to "apply either to Asia or Africa, especially not to India and Palestine, but only to those peoples in hitherto sovereign countries conquered by Germany, Italy and Japan" (ibid.). But, as Bruce Hoffman (1998, p. 47) observes, "the damage had already been done."
What followed was a renewal of the anti-colonial wave of terror that marked the early interwar years in the Middle East. Owing to the technological advances in weaponry spurred by the Second World War, the terrorists were better armed this time around. Emboldened by the weakening of the European colonial powers as war shifted the locus of global supremacy toward Washington, terrorism in the service of national liberation extended its reach across North Africa, the Mediterranean and Asia. On the last of these continents at least, the great military historian Basil Liddell Hart traces the emergence of nationalist movements to the British Army's collapse at Singapore on 15 February 1942: "Its easy capture ... was shattering to British, and European, prestige. ... The white man had lost his ascendancy with the disproof of his magic. The realization of his vulnerability fostered and encouraged the post-war spread of Asiatic revolt against European domination or intrusion" (Liddell Hart [1971] 1999, p. 233).
Algeria
The postwar wave of terror began in Algeria, as we have seen. By 1954, V.E. Day's violence at Sdtif had evolved into full-blown civil war as local aspirations for national independence ran head-long into the strong opposition on the part of Algeria's considerable European population to any thought Paris might have of abandoning its authority (Rapoport, 2004, SSpringer p. 53). Similar conflicting aspirations produced terrorism in Northern Ireland, where the preferences of Ulster's Anglican majority for remaining British clashed with the Catholic minority's wish for republican union with the South, and in Cyprus, where the Turkish community did not want to be ruled from Athens, which was the aim of the Greek terrorist group, Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA), and where the British wanted to maintain military bases to support operations in the Middle East (ibid.).
During the first two years of Algerian civil war, the anti-colonial terrorist campaign conducted by the Front de Lib6ration Nationale (F.L.N.) deliberately had been non-lethal. It principally targeted symbols of colonial rulebombing French government offices and buildings, military facilities and police stationsrather than human beings (Hoffman, 1998, p. 62) . Towards the middle of 1956, however, with "precious few tangible achievements to show for its efforts", and in reaction to the growing effectiveness of France's countermeasures, culminating in the execution by guillotine of two of its operatives, the F.L.N. changed strategies in favor of mass urban terror.
Within 72 h of announcing that 100 Frenchmen would be killed for every martyr to the F.L.N. cause, 49 European civilians had been gunned down. In August, the group orchestrated the coordinated bombings of three public venues frequented by the colons (or pieds noir, as they were by then often called): a seaside milk bar, an Algiers cafeteria popular among European university students, and the downtown Air France terminus. Three people were killed and some 50 injured in the attacks, the first lethal round in what would become an ever-more-vicious cycle of terrorist outrage and heavy-handed French repression. On 28 December 1956, the French mayor of Algiers was assassinated by F.L.N. cadres. The mayor's assassination triggered anti-Muslim rioting and that, in turn, provoked a new round of F.L.N. killings. One month later, the F.L.N. declared a general striketimed to coincide with the convening of a UN General Assembly discussion of the Algerian conflict and launched a two-week campaign of bombing, expanding its targets to include popular bars and restaurants, crowded city streets and sports stadiums, killing 15 people and wounding 105 others in what would become known as the "Battle of Algiers" (ibid., pp. 57, 62-63).
In response, France redoubled her efforts to maintain order in the city under the leadership of General Jacques Massu, commander of the 10th Parachute Division and a veteran of Indochina. Although Massu eventually "won" the battle for control of Algiers, his strategy for doing so, which relied on gathering intelligence to identify and track down terrorist leaders, encouraged abuses that would foreshadow Abu Ghraib: "Torture of both terrorists and suspected terrorists became routine" (ibid., p. 63; emphasis in original). The normally apathetic Arab "street" was driven into the arms of the F.L.N. by the French Army's brutality; public opinion in metropolitan France turned sharply against continuation of colonial rule. Massu's victory was Pyrrhic. Five years later, France withdrew from Algeria and granted independence (ibid., pp. 63-64).
Cyprus
A series of similar events played out in Cyprus, where, by 1955, the EOKA had succeeded in throwing the island into complete chaos. Never more than 400 active terrorists strong, the Greek Cypriot organization employed hit-and-run tactics against the much larger British security force deployed on station, managing to kill over the next four years an average of two soldiers or policeman every week. The British never were really in the game, constantly kept off balance and unable to bring their superior military strength effectively to bear in countering a small, cohesive group that did not seek outright victory, but "to rely on dramatic, -Springer well-orchestrated and appropriately timed acts of violence to focus international attention on the situation in Cyprus and ... the demand for enosisunification with Greece" (ibid., pp.
57-58). Like the F.L.N., the EOKA concentrated its attacks on the island's urban centers, where incidents would command immediate media attention and where it could hamstring
British responses by forcing troops to be dispersed citywide on static guard duty missions at scores of potential terrorist targets, perhaps none of which would be hit on any given day (ibid., p. 58).
The asymmetry between the target-rich EOKA and the target-poor, nearly 40,000-member British security force stationed on Cyprus ultimately worked in the former's favor.10 Foreshadowing the relationship later forged between the IRA and Sein Fein, the EOKA's campaign of violence also benefited significantly from close coordination with Archbishop Makarios III, who simultaneously pursued the goal of enosis through diplomatic channels. Britain reacted to the terrorists' "apparent ability to strike anywhere, anytime" and to the growing "public frustration caused by disruption to daily life" by interning and then exiling Makarios to the Seychelles in 1956. He was allowed to return to Cyprus two years later, however, to fulfill a Greek Cypriot condition for participation in multilateral peace talks. Those talks eventually produced agreement, in February 1959, granting Cyprus independence, if not unification. Archbishop Makarios became the new nation's first president (ibid., pp. 59-60).
Israel
Celebrated by Leon Uris in his novel, Exodus, and in David Lean's film of the same title, the anti-British violence that accompanied the birth of Israel is perhaps the most well-known of the terrorist campaigns that followed Allied victory in the Second World War. The campaign was spearheaded by the Irgun, which, as noted previously, first appeared on the Palestinian scene in the 1930s. It recommenced operations against Britain's security forces, charged by London with the ultimately futile task of controlling immigration by tens of thousands of Jews fleeing Nazi Holocaust and war-devastated Eastern Europe, in February 1944. Menachem Begin, who had assumed command of Irgun three months earlier, recognized that his group was hopelessly outgunned. He therefore aimed "not to defeat Britain militarily, but to use terrorist violence to undermine the government's prestige and control of Palestine by striking at symbols of British rule" (ibid., p. 50). The Irgun announced the end of its wartime suspension of hostilities against Britain with coordinated bombings of immigration offices in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa. It followed that announcement up over the next two years with a series of carefully planned attacks on British land registry offices as well as on the security forces themselves. The apogee of the Irgun's terrorist campaign was reached in 
Lessons
The main lesson of the first post-Second World War wave of terrorism is that terrorism can succeed. The violence directed against occupying colonial forces by the F.L.N., the EOKA and the Irgun was instrumental in securing national independence for Algeria, Cyprus and Israel. These three historical examples show how relatively small groups of urban guerillas, though overmanned and outgunned by regular armies on the ground, can demoralize great empires by waging campaigns of carefully planned attacks on targets inevitably left pregnable by the larger, but less flexible forces arrayed against them. Terrorists do not have to defeat their opponents militarily; they only have to avoid losing (Hoffman, 1998, p. 52) .
A second lesson is that a terrorist group's cause can be advanced considerably by repressive countermeasures. Combined with the "psychological impact" produced by tarnishing the image of a government unable to maintain order (ibid. p. 53), terrorists can shift public opinion toward their causeor turn it against their adversariesby goading local governmental officials and security personnel into responding heavy handedly, disrupting the normal daily lives of the civilian population and meeting each terrorist atrocity with an even greater outrage. Exploiting public opinion on both margins requires publicity. Success in choreographing violence so as to gain the attention of external audiences was one of the most significant achievements of the leaders of the terrorist wave of the late 1940s and 1950s, who were the first to recognize its potential (ibid., p. 65). It was a lesson taken to heart by their successors.
Left-wing terrorism
Oh, my friends, ... you cannot imagine what sorrow and anger seize one's whole soul when a great idea, which one has long and piously revered, is picked up by some bunglers and dragged into the street, to more fools like themselves, and one suddenly concluded that terrorism was undermining its political prospects. That widely condemned act backfired doubly by energizing the government's counterterrorism efforts. As a result of the post-Moro crackdown, by 1982 some 1400 members of the Red Brigade had been arrested, many of whom, promised leniency in return for cooperation (Ferracuti, 1990, p. 62 ) and christened the pentiti, disavowed their former comrades and assisted the police in identifying the group's leaders, only one of whom still remained at large in 1984. The Red Brigade soon passed into history (Hoffman, 1998, p. 29 ).
Palestinian complicity
Although both Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof likewise had been arrested (and both had committed suicide while in prison),12 the RAF soldiered on under new leadership, as did its sister German terrorist organization, the Second of June Movement, infamous for its attack on a Jewish synagogue on the anniversary of Kristallnacht (Rapoport, 2004, p. 59 ). 13 Black September, eight strong on the morning of 5 September 1972, killed two of the Israeli athletes immediately and took nine others hostage. The group offered to exchange its hostages for 236 Palestinians imprisoned in Israel and five other terrorists being held in West German jails, among whom were Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof, plus a guarantee of safe passage to an Arab country. After a deal was struck, the terrorists and their hostages were transported on two helicopters to a Lufthansa Boeing 747 waiting at a nearby military airbase. Expecting to be flown to Cairo, which initially had agreed to serve as the site for the hostage exchange but subsequently decided to refuse landing rights, the helicopters were instead met by a prearranged rescue operation, including a contingent of five West German police sharpshooters. One German policeman and all but three of the Black September terrorists were killed in the ensuing firefight. So, too, were all nine Israeli hostages, apparently the victims of a hand grenade tossed by a terrorist into one of the helicopter's cabins (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 71-72) .
Left-wing terrorism in Europe and
Springer
Palestinian assistance also helped sustain the Japanese Red Army (JRA), which after a brief but eventful terrorist career, found asylum in Lebanon. JRA operatives committed murders, hijacked a commercial Japanese aircraft, and sabotaged a Shell oil refinery in Singapore and the French embassy compound in The Hague. They linked up from time to time with Carlos ("The Jackal") and joined forces with their Palestinian benefactors to participate in the massacre at Tel Aviv's Lod Airport (Laqueur, 1999, p. 30) .
By 1985, the collaboration between the Germans and the Palestinians had flourished so much so that the RAF joined forces with Action Directe (AD), its counterpart leftist terrorist organization in France. The leaders of the two groups envisioned forming an umbrella group on the PLO model that would include a resuscitated Red Brigade and Belgium's Communist Combatant Cells (CCC) for the purpose of launching a wave of "Euroterrorism" targeting NATO installations and personnel. That vision never became reality, however. As it had in Italy, effective police work leading to the arrests of leading members of the French and Belgian groups crippled the terrorists' grand strategy. Perhaps as important, monumental events taking place behind the Iron Curtain -Gorbachevian glasnost and perestroika, the rise of the Solidarity labor movement in Poland, and so onprogressively undermined the ideological foundations of the European left-wing terrorist groups. Those foundations collapsed fully in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down, not least because German reunification eliminated the terrorists' ready-to-hand sanctuary in the East. The RAF disbanded for good in 1992, although the group's true-believing holdouts, acknowledging that they were "stuck in a dead end", did not announce its demise officially until April 1998 (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 83-84;  Pillar, 2001, p. 42) .
The Americas
Left-wing terrorism was not confined to Europe and Japan in the middle decades of the post-Second World War period; it was a global phenomenon. In the United States, the 1960s gave rise to, among others, the Weathermen, the Black Panthers and the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA). The last two groups, embracing the Maoist dictum that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun", adopted a modus operandi for carrying out their racist "armed struggle" indistinguishable from that of ordinary criminals, robbing banks and committing the occasional murder (Laqueur, 1999, (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 76-77) .
Even before the Armenian terrorist groups became active, however, the police's inability to cope with widespread terrorist violence prompted Ankara to impose martial law in 1971. Order had for the most part been restored three years later, martial law was lifted and a general amnesty was declared. "That turned out to be a costly mistake", in Walter Laqueur's (1999, p. 31) judgment. Terrorist activity soon resumed with a vengeance. In 1978-1979, some 2400 political murders were committed in Turkey. The threat of open warfare in the streets prompted the army to again take control in October 1980. Rounding up 75,000 terrorist suspects and seizing more than 730,000 weapons, the generals succeeded in returning Turkey to a state of comparative normalcy within a few days (ibid.).
The army's tough countermeasures did not fully put an end to the wave of violence perpetrated by the Armenian terrorists, though. Adhering explicitly to a Marxist-Leninist SSpringer ideology, the ASALA was by and large indifferent to the identities of its targets. It bombed the Turkish airline's ticket counter at Paris's Orly Airport in July 1983, killing seven and injuring 56. One month later, the group killed nine more people and wounded 78 others in an attack at Ankara's Esenboga Airport; an ASALA assault on Istanbul's Grand Bazaar, also in August, claimed another 29 casualties, including two dead. The JCAG, by contrast, pursued a more conventional nationalist-separatist strategy of spreading terror by assassinating Turkish government officials and striking with non-lethal force at symbols of Turkish hegemony. All told, Armenian terrorists murdered more than 40 Turkish civil servants and members of their families in the decade after the two groups' founding (Hoffman, 1998, p. 77) .
Spain, the Netherlands and Ireland
Much the same blends of leftist ideology and ethnic separatism animated, at least initially, the terrorist activities of Spain's Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), which translates as "Basque Nation (or Fatherland) and Liberty", the militant South Moluccan expatriates in the Netherlands, and the Irish Republican Army, all of which waged campaigns of violence from the late 1960s on.
Effectively suppressed by General Franco, although they did manage to derail a Spanish train in 1961 while he was still in power, the high tide of ETA terrorism came in 1978-1980. Grounded in the injustices felt by Spain's Basque minority, aggrieved by being ruled from Madrid and yearning for the creation of a separate Basque state, the ETA succeeded in assassinating Franco's successor, Admiral Carrero Blanco, and then added considerably to its victim list over the next two years by committing another 170 political murders (Laqueur, 1999 , p. 35) .
The 15,000 South Moluccans who had emigrated to the Netherlands in 1951 after their republic had forcibly been incorporated by Indonesia, becoming the state of Negara Indonesia Timur, nursed similar grievances. Fed up with the lack of progress toward reestablishment of their national homeland, in June 1977 splinter elements of the Free South Moluccan Organization hijacked a Dutch passenger train and occupied a nearby schoolhouse. Hostages were taken in both incidents, but the terrorists were thwarted by Royal Dutch Marines, who managed to regain control of the train and the schoolhouse with minimal loss of innocent life (Hoffman, 1998, p. 79) .
The Irish Republican Army, already a half-century old, transformed itself into a terrorist organization in the late 1960s, initiating a time of "Troubles" for Ulster that was at its bloodiest during the five years spanning 1972 to 1976. The IRA's body count declined significantly thereafter (Laqueur, 1999, p. 33), but beginning in the latter part of that decade, the group's change of focus helped revive the "Golden Age of Assassination". IRA operatives assassinated the British ambassador to Ireland in 1976 and, three years later, murdered Lord Mountbatten, retired Viceroy of India and member of the royal family (ibid.; Rapoport, 2004, p. 57). On 12 October 1984, avenging nine jailed terrorists who died as a result of a hunger strike protesting their treatment as ordinary criminals (Rapoport, 2004, p. 57) , an IRA bomb detonated at the Grand Hotel in Brighton narrowly missed killing Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Claiming responsibility for the failed assassination plot, the group released a letter driving home the fundamental asymmetry between terrorists and their high-profile targets: "Today, we were unlucky. But remember we have only to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always" (quoted in Mickolus et al., 1989, vol. 2, p. 115) .
The IRA was not the only group to resurrect the strategy of assassinating prominent political figures as the second post-1945 wave of terrorism washed its way around the globe. 
Lessons
Although the second terrorist wave has been characterized here as primarily left-wing in origin, the three decades running from 1960 to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 also were marked by the internationalization of terrorism. The PLO, as we have seen, played a major role in elevating terrorism to the global stage, not only as a result of the network of ideologically diverse terrorist groups it assembled in Europe and elsewhere by supplying training, money and weapons, but also by virtue of the terrorist acts carried out on its own account: the Palestinians "were more active in Europe than on the West Bank, and sometimes more active in Europe than many European groups themselves were" (Rapoport, 2004, p. 58) .
If the late nineteenth century was the "Golden Age of Assassination", the middle of the twentieth century's second half must have been the "Golden Age of Hijackings". Seven hundred of those incidents occurred during the ascendancy of the Palestinian-supported left-wing groups. Commercial aircraft were hijacked to gain media attention for terrorist causes, to secure hostages for use as bargaining chips in negotiating terrorist demands, and to tarnish the images of western governments. Other hostage events, such as the storming of the Nicaraguan Congress by the Sandinistas in 1978, the seizure of the Columbian Supreme  Court by the terrorist group M-19 in 1985 (ibid., p. 57 (Rapoport, 2004, pp. 57, 59) . 15 "They are bent on the destruction of the current Western system, .... but they are not really interested in what should come after that destruction" (Kellen, 1990, p. 55) . Like the Russian nihilists of the previous century, the New Left terrorists wanted to wreck the "system", but had no practical plans for replacing it, other than with "universally all-human social republic and harmony" (Dostoevsky [1872] 1994, p. 53) . Living in a "fantasy world" (Laqueur, 1999, p. 28) , "they got everything out of books, and even at the first rumor from our progressive corners in the capital were prepared to throw anything whatsoever out the window, provided they were advised to throw it out" (Dostoevsky [1872] 1994, p. 31). As Russell Hardin (1995, p. 41) observes, "Coordination without clear enough purpose will soon collapse." 16 According to Walter Laqueur (1999, p. 45) , "the only effective weapon against terrorism in the modern era has been the infiltration of their ranks and the use of informers." Paul Pillar agrees, emphasizing the importance Springer attempt to rescue the nine Israeli athletes taken hostage by Black September at the Munich Olympics, West Germany quickly moved to create the GSG-9 (Grenzschutzgruppe Neun), a special anti-terrorist unit of the national border police. France and Britain followed suit, establishing, respectively, the Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale (GIGN) and the Special Air Services (SAS) Regiment. These counterterrorism specialists carried out a number of successful operations over the next few years, for example, rescuing, in 1977, all 86 passengers on a Lufthansa flight hijacked to Mogadishu by a combined team of Palestinian and West German terrorists and, in 1980, saving 19 of the 21 hostages taken during a siege of the Iranian embassy in London, killing five of the six terrorists.17 Had the United States done the same, the events shortly to play out at its embassy in Teheran might have ended differently (Hoffman, 1998, pp. 72-73) .18
Islamist terrorism
The Messenger of God said: "A martyr has six privileges with God. He is forgiven his sins on the shedding of the first drop of blood; he is shown his place in paradise; he is redeemed from the torments of the grave; he is made secure from the fear of hell and a crown of glory is placed on his head of which one ruby is worth more than the world and all that is in it; he will marry seventy-two of the huris with black eyes; and his intercession will be accepted for seventy of his kinsmen." "cell-by-cell, terrorist-by-terrorist disruption of terrorist infrastructures, mainly  accomplished through raids, arrests, interrogations, and other measures by ... police and security services  S. ." (Pillar, 2001, p. xli) . If the top leaders of terrorist groups, like dictators, have incentives to hold on to their positions of power by weakening or eliminating potential rivals (Tullock, 1974, pp. 72-73) , then capturing or killing high-profile terrorist kingpins, such as Osama bin Laden, promises to advance the war on terror considerably insofar as their successors will tend to be less able. 17 States, 2004, p. 96) . States, 2004, p. 96) . 19 Quoted in Rapoport (1990, pp. 117-118 2003, p. 147) . Following the Prophet's death, successors at first were chosen from among his contemporaries, but as those too passed away, that method of selection was rendered impractical. One group, who became the Shi'a, argued that the Caliphate should remain in the hands of Mohammed's lineal descendants. Another group, who became the Sunni, contended that the Caliphate could be held by any man meeting certain standards of faith and learning. A series of bloody struggles led to Sunni ascendancy, a position it generally retains to this day.20 A second element involves the strand of fundamentalism woven into Islamic theology in the eighteenth century by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1787) , an Arabian cleric who fathered "a campaign of purification and renewal. His purpose was to return the Muslim world to the pure and authentic Islam of the Prophet, removing and, where necessary, destroying all later accretions" (Lewis, 2001, p. 59) . Wahhabism, and its own later accretions, represented in the writings of Sayyid Qutb, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood executed in 1996 on charges of treason against the Egyptian government (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 51), leads its adherents to disdain above all "false Muslims", imposters who have strayed from the true faith and, hence, merit treatment as kaffir (or kufr), unbelievers beyond the protection of the Ummah (Coll, 2004, p. 203; Zakaria, 2003, p. 125) . Such sentiments motivated the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981 by a group calling itself "The Islamic Group of Egypt", more popularly known as Al-Jihad, because of his failure to govern the country according to the Shar'ia (Rapoport, 1990 , pp. 104, 106) .21
Already having established such a force, Israeli commandos stormed the Air France aircraft hijacked to Entebbe in June 1976, killing all of the terrorists and rescuing all but one of the 105 hostages (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
America's Delta Force was not created until the late 1970s. Its first test, during the Iranian hostage crisis in April 1980, was the disastrous "Desert One" operation, in which five airmen and three marines perished (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United
Contempt for the betrayers of Islam within their own ranks helps explain the late Yassir Arafat's uneasy relationship with Hamas, "a de facto branch of the Muslim Brotherhood" founded in December 1987 (Laqueur, 1999, p. 138) : his desire to establish an independent, secular Palestinian state made him vulnerable to being labeled un-Islamic. So, too, does scorn for false Muslims explain why many Islamist terrorists began their careers fighting their own governments: "The Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed." But they are also "more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic" than the true believers would prefer (Zakaria, 2003, pp. 120, 125) . Buying protection against accusations of betraying the true faith, "hoping to gain legitimacy by association" (ibid., p. 145), also may explain why the House of Saud openly embraces Wahhabism and generously funds fundamentalist religious schools (madrasas) and terrorist groups throughout the region.22 Last, fundamentalist hatred 20 Iran often is identified as the only nation within the modem Middle East where Shi'a comprise the majority (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 50; Keegan, 2004, p. 43 ), but 60% of Iraq's 25 million souls are Shi'a (Zakaria, 2003, p. 261) . Iran, to be sure, was the only Muslim nation where Shi'a dominated the institutions of government prior to Saddam Hussein's overthrow by "Operation Iraqi Freedom". 21 Assassination is far from new in the Muslim world. Some 35% to 40% of the caliphs following in the for the repressive, staunchly pro-American, insufficiently Muslim regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi propelled the Ayatollah Khomeini from exile in Paris to Iran's highest office.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 was wholly unexpected (Rapoport, 2004, p. 62) . Nor was the United States at all prepared for the revolutionaries' seizure of its embassy in Teheran, an event which plunged Jimmy Carter into a protracted hostage crisis that wrecked his presidency and catapulted Ronald Reagan into the White House.23 Ayatollah Khomeini's successful toppling of the Shah swept a Shi'a theocracy into power in Iran (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 52), subjecting the Iranians to a "dour,  puritanical faith, policed by petty theocrats and religious commissars" (Zakaria, 2003, p. 145) . The Iranian Revolution also laid the foundations for the third post-1945 wave of terrorism. Khomeini's regime "inspired and assisted" Shi'a terrorist groups in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Lebanon, most notoriously in the last of these where Hisballah (the "Party of God") soon came into existence (Rapoport, 2004, p. 62 ). Terrorism had a new "able and active state sponsor", a role Iran played throughout the 1990s (Pillar, 2001, p. 46 ).24
Afghanistan and the collapse of the Soviet Union
The foundations for the third wave of terrorism simultaneously were laid in Afghanistan, invaded by the Soviet Union the same year to put down a Muslim revolt against its puppet government in Kabul. The war against the mujaheddin was to last a decade, ending in 1989 with the withdrawal of Soviet troops bloodied by irregular "Arab Afghans" drawn from across the Sunni Ummah to participate "in what was the most important jihad of their lifetimes" (Pillar, 2001, p. 46) . The "freedom fighters" were subsidized generously both by Saudi Arabia and the United States. Conducting one of the Cold War's eleventh-hour conflicts by proxy, America supplied the mujaheddin with some $4 to $5 billion worth of modern weaponry (Rashid, 2000, p. 18) , including 900 Stinger missiles (ibid., p. 44), which it funneled covertly to them through Pakistan's Interservices Intelligence Directorate (ISID).
The Afghan war contributed to the rise of Islamist terrorism in several ways. First and foremost, "it provided terrorist-related skills and experience (in the use of firearms and explosives) to large numbers of non-Afghan militants" (Pillar, 2001, p. 46) . Secondly, it launched Osama bin Laden to prominence as a terrorist entrepreneur. Bin Laden, who for a time served as the main conduit of Saudi assistance to the mujaheddin (to which he added some of his own considerable wealth) and who brought his managerial skills to bear in helping to set up training camps for newly arrived fighters and to organize and strengthen Afghani resistance, established personal contact with many like-minded Muslims, making connections that would soon serve him well in creating the al-Qaeda terrorist network. Third, the flotsam of the Arab world who participated in the Afghan war drew from the Soviet Union's humiliation on the battlefield "the lesson that violence and Islam could defeat anyone", including the "Great Satan" left standing as the world's sole remaining superpower after 1989 (ibid.). Fourth, following the Soviet exit (and the collapse of its puppet regime in 1992), Afghanistan was left awash in money, guns and idle, battle-hardened Arab veterans, providing an immense stockpile of resources available for redeployment in support of Islamist terrorism wherever opportunity knocked.
23
Fifty-three Americans were held hostage. That event, the 9/11 Commission observed laconically, "ended the State Department's leadership in counterterrorism" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 94) . 24 Enders and Sandler (2000) report very strong statistical support for the conjecture that the third terrorist wave began in 1979. They also find that terrorist incidents have on average become more bloody since then.
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This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Fri, 22 Jan 2016 16:46:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions A final motivating force behind the third wave of terror, already underway at the start of the 1980s, can be found in the collapse of the Soviet Union itself in the decade's final year, an event as stunning and as unanticipated as the Iranian Revolution had been. The end of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and Central Asia opened the door to a host of ethnic or religiously based conflicts that had previously been repressed by authoritarian power. Although many of these conflicts have local causes, the terrorism that emerged in now-defunct Yugoslavia and in many of the former Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan, Chechnya, Georgia and Tajikistan, has transnational dimensions as well (ibid., p. 43). Moreover, other Muslim states formerly within the Soviet orbit, especially so Albania, have become safe havens for terrorist training and network-building (ibid. p. 44).
Beirut and beyond
Although most scholars trace the roots of the third post-1945 wave of terrorism to the events of 1979 in Teheran, the "new terrorism" also has an old friend, the Palestinian Liberation Organization. By the early 1980s, more than 40 different terrorist groups from around the world had received training in the PLO's camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Yemen (Hoffman, 1998, p. 84) . Reinforced by the Iranian-backed Hisballah, Lebanon, mired in civil war since 1975 (Laqueur, 1999, p. 135 The last decade of the twentieth century also brought terror back to Algeria. Spurred by an Islamic revival that began there in the late 1970s, the Muslim political party FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) won impressive victories in the 1991 national elections. The ruling government, whose political base rested on the more secular Algerian middle class, responded to electoral defeat by nullifying the results, declaring a state of emergency and banning its Islamic opposition. Civil war soon erupted. The Muslim side of that war has been dominated by the brutal GIA (Armed Islamic Group), whose core consists of a hundred or so veterans of Afghanistan. Partial to cutting the throats of its victims, the GIA has killed indiscriminately, targeting teachers, journalists and government workers, including letter carriers and street sweepers. It set a deadline of 1 January 1994 for all foreign nationals to leave the country and, over the next two years, slaughtered about one hundred of those who did not heed its warning, among which were 12 Croat technicians, a French bishop, and a number of priests, nuns and pensioners. The GIA carried its terror to metropolitan France in 1995, killing eight civilians in the Paris metro and other public places (Laqueur, 1999, pp. 130-133) ; more than 180 others were wounded during that bombing campaign, which ran from July to October. By century's end, as many as 100,000 people are thought to have perished in the Algerian bloodbath that began in 1992 and is still underway (Pillar, 2001, p. 19 ).
The constitutional perspective
The advantages of possessing the control of the powers of the government, and thereby of its honors and emoluments, are, of themselves, exclusive of all other considerations, ample to divide... a community into two great hostile parties. No one then living within the boundaries of wrecked Ottoman suzerainty or in the colonies of the defeated German and Austro-Hungarian empires was present when decisions were being taken about the area's future geopolitical landscape: "Europeans and Americans were the only ones seated around the table ..." (Fromkin, 1989, p. 17) . As a result of the victorious powers' ignorance of the ground, the pressure of time, a hunger for vengeance, an inclination to maintain and even to expand colonial spheres of influence, and, without doubt, countless other factors, new national frontiers were fabricated with little regard for customary tribal and ethnic territorial claims or existing trade patterns and social networks. In consequence, the map that emerged from the Paris Peace Conference and from the events that followed over the next few years was by and large imposed arbitrarily by outsiders, introducing "an artificial state system into the Middle East [the Balkans, Central Asia and beyond] that has made it into a region of countries that have not yet become nations even today" (ibid.)
Afghanistan
Afghanistan exemplifies. Its southern border was first drawn in the late nineteenth century by Sir Mortimer Durand, the colonial government of India's foreign secretary, expressly to divide the Pashtun tribe's homeland in half, thereby creating a buffer zone against Russian expansionism on India's northwest frontier. When the Pashtunis who found themselves on the Indian side of the Durand line failed to integrate themselves peaceably under the Raj, the North-West Frontier Province was sliced off from the Punjab to create a second, inner buffer. These two "tribal belts" were incorporated formally within the boundaries of Pakistan when that nation separated from newly independent India under the Partition Plan effective 14 August 1947 (Hilton, 2001 ).
Afghanistan's northern border was drawn by Josef Stalin. Formalized in the so-called Settlement of 1922, a series of treaties between the Soviet Union and a number of its neighbors, including Turkey and Persia (Fromkin, 1989, p. 559) , carved up a region, "comprising modern day Tajikistan, southern Uzbekistan, and northern Afghanistan", that had been "one contiguous territory for centuries" (Rashid, 2001, p. 146) .30 Like Sir Mortimer Durand before him, Stalin apparently intended to create his own buffer zone against the Pashtuns (and the Raj) by stranding sizeable Tajik and Uzbek populations in territory that thenceforth became part of Afghanistan.
The Middle East
Much the same forces shaped frontiers in the Middle East: "Iraq and what we now call Jordan, for example, were British inventions, lines drawn on an empty map ..." (Fromkin, Azerbaijan" (ibid.) . The sequel to the First World War is as significant for what it did not do, as it is for what it did do. On the agenda for settlement in 1921, the issue of independence or autonomy for the Kurds "somehow disappeared from the agenda in 1922"; Kurdistan was not to be (ibid., p. 560). As a result of that non-decision, the Kurds, mostly Sunni Muslims thought to be of 30 Turkestan already had been carved out of the previously independent Muslim Central Asian world by the czars (Fromkin, 1989, p. 477 The foundations for much of the terrorism of the twentieth century (and certainly that of both the first and third post-1945 terrorist waves) thus were laid in 1914-1922. (To the extent that the left-wing terrorist groups declared common cause withand received substantial support fromthe oppressed peoples of the Third World, the Palestinians in particular, so too were the second wave's foundations.) Churchill's haphazard decision separating Transjordan -"a disordered area of tribal conflict" (ibid., p. 442)from the balance of Britain's Palestine Mandate echoes down to this day:32 the view still persists in Israel, especially so in the ranks of the Herut Party, that "Jordan either is or should be an Arab Palestinian state" (ibid., p. 528) . The colonial attitudes informing the policies adopted by Britain and France in exercising the mandatory powers granted to them by the League of Nations also contributed to the rise of modem terrorism. For their part, the British attempted to displace "the basis of political life in the Middle Eastreligion -[with] nationalism or dynastic loyalty" (ibid., p. 17). On the other hand, "the French government, which in the Middle East did allow religion to be the basis of politicseven of its ownchampioned one sect [the Christians] against the others ...", thereby helping foster the civil strife that has ravaged Lebanon ever since (ibid., p. 17; emphasis in original).
1989, p. 17), as Winston Churchill's boast adopted as an epigraph above so well illustrates. Similarly, "the boundaries of Saudi Arabia [and] Kuwait ... were established by a British civil servant in 1922, and the frontiers between Muslims and Christians were drawn by France in Syria-Lebanon and by Russia on the borders of Armenia and Soviet
And (Keegan, 2004, pp. 14-15) .
Britain sought to redress the grievances that led to revolt by appointing a council of Iraqi ministers through which to rule indirectly, in the hope that the council would be more acceptable to the general population than direct military administration. "Perhaps inevitably, however, a majority of the appointees were ... chosen from the Sunni minority, since they were identified by the British as more dependable and experienced than Shi'a or Kurds. the 1930s" (Fromkin, 1989, p. 559) . 32 C. D. Brunton, a British officer serving in Transjordan wrote presciently that "the people here do not form a homogeneous political entity.... You cannot expect them to form a government for their common country" (Fromkin, 1989, p. 443 
Lessons
The geopolitical decisions taken in the aftermath of the First World War have had disastrous consequences for the Middle East and for Central Asia, as similarly arbitrary mapmaking also had for sub-Saharan Africa (Rowley, 1999) . Members of some close-knit ethnic groups suddenly found themselves on opposite sides of new, unasked-for national borders; others were compelled to share ground with their enemies of old. Ethnic violence and tribal warfare were the predictable outcomes of that unhappy state of affairs as rival groups contested for control of the levers of local, regional or national political power. Autocrats, who "placed their highest priority on preserving the elite's grip on national wealth" (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004, p. 53), would rise and fall as their supporting coalitions gained the upper handonly to be displaced by some other strongman. Political authority would be exercised not by sharing power with other groups, but by repressing them. Short of wholesale reconfiguration of the maps of the Middle East and Central Asia, as has been proposed for sub-Saharan Africa (Kimenyi, 1999) , liberal constitutions offer a republican cure for the factional diseases plaguing the failed states that were created in 1914-1922 and have been the incubators of post-1945 terrorist activity. Federal systems of government that shift most political decision-making authority away from the center toward regions having a high degree of local autonomy, combined with a representative legislature empowered to resolve tightly defined questions of national policy, are time-tested ways of accommodating the diverse interests of an ethnically or religiously heterogeneous polity (Frey & Eichenberger, 1999) .33
The writing and ratification of liberal constitutions establishing the rule of law, securing private property rights and civil liberties, and, above all, limiting governmental powers, require a society's politically effective groups to coordinate on a particular political (and sometimes economic) order, to those groups' mutual advantage (Hardin, 1999, pp. vii-viii) .
It is an open question whether such coordination is possible in Afghanistan, Iraq and many of the other pseudo states in that part of the world where terrorism has raised its ugly head. What is clear, however, is that for democratic reforms to have a chance, constitutionalism must precede popular voting. "Elections alone do not produce democracy" (Zakaria, 2003, p. 259 ) and, in fact, if voting comes before the establishment of liberal political institutions the very reason for having a constitution in the first placeone risks domination of the constitution-writing stage by the very same well-organized factions that controlled power in the preceding autocratic regime. Russia, whose popularly elected president, Vladimir Putin, rules autocratically, supplies a cautionary tale.
Those who are impatient for democracy in the Middle East and Central Asia as well as doubtful that new constitutions and, perhaps, new political maps are required to mitigate 33 Frey (2004, pp. 85-92) recently has extolled the virtues of "polycentricity" as a way of reducing a nation's vulnerability to terrorist attacks. A polycentric political system would, in my view, make terrorism less likely in the first place.
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This content downloaded from 194.94.133.193 on Fri, 22 Jan 2016 16:46:49 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions the root causes of terrorism should remember that "it took Europe a millennium and a half to resolve its post-Roman crisis of social and political identity: nearly a thousand years to settle on the nation-state form of political organization, and nearly five hundred years more to determine which nations were entitled to be states" (Fromkin, 1989, p. 565 ). Indeed, "it was only at the end of the nineteenth century, with the creation of Germany and Italy, that an accepted map of western Europe finally emerged, some 1,500 years after the old Roman map started to become obsolete" (ibid.). It may well take another millennium and a half before the centrifugal forces set in motion by the Soviet Union's collapse, the defeat of the Taliban and the toppling of Saddam Hussein coalesce into some semblance of sustainable geopolitical order.
Concluding remarks
This paper has traced the history of modern terrorism from the end of the Second World War to the beginning of the twenty-first century. It divided that history into three stylized waves: terrorism in the service of national liberation and ethnic separatism, left-wing terrorism, and Islamist terrorism. Adopting a constitutional political economy perspective, the paper argued that the terrorism The history of terrorism in the second half of the twentieth century would have been quite different had Transjordan, as it was intended to be, been made a Palestinian homeland; if Kurdistan had not been mysteriously overlooked in the Settlement of 1922; if a line had not been drawn around Iraq, but that Mesopotamia had instead been divided along its three natural internal boundaries; and if Armenians, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Pashtuns, Punjabis and many other ethnic populations had not been marooned across the borders of two or more contrived nation-states. Alternatively, imagine that, instead of rewarding Arab chieftains with monarchial powers, elevating Sunni over Shi'a or Muslim over Christian, Britain and France had imposed federalist constitutions, providing for weak central governments, substantial local or regional autonomy, and a recognized right of secession, on the nations of the Middle East as then (and now) configured. What might have been?
It is somewhat ironic that, at the same time nationalism and ethnic separatism are on the rise in the Middle East and Central Asia, accompanied by the terrorism that has been their historical handmaiden, Europe itself is moving in the opposite direction, toward centralization of governmental authority in Brussels. In order to implement fuller political and economic union on the Continent, a new European constitution was written and submitted for ratification by the Union's member states. The decisive rejection of that document by voters in France and the Netherlands in the spring of 2005 proved that, for very different reasons, national sovereignty is not to be sold cheaply by Europe's political elites. Constitutional design evidently still matters. It, not democracy, also ought to be Europe's (and America's) top priority for dealing with the threat of modern terrorism. Springer 
